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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2012, a sea of Catalonians, 1.5 million according to
the Urban Guard and 600,000 according to the Government Delegation,
protested under the slogan: "Catalonia, new European State."' The
Government of the Generalitat encouraged this manifestation, which took
place on the National Day of Catalonia.2 The protesters demanded the
independence of Catalonia as well as improved funding to Catalonia from
the Spanish State.3 The 2012 National Day of Catalonia protest was of
historic significance for the Catalonian people, not only because it was the
largest protest ever in Barcelona, but also because of its triggering effect on
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2014, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law
Center. Juris Doctor, Universitat de Barcelona School of Law, December 2012. I owe thanks to my
parents and sister, who never thought I would finish this paper. All errors are my own.
1. Antonio Baquero & Carlos Mirquez Daniel, Catalunya Clama por la Independencia
[Cataluiia Cries for Independence], EL PERIODICO (Sept. 11, 2013, 3:14 PM),
http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/diada-2012/print-2202293.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
2. Cristian Reino, Una Marea Soberanista Reclama la Independencia en Barcelona [A
Sovereignist Tide Claims for Independence in Barcelona], DIARIOVASCO.COM (May 5, 2013, 7:22
PM), http://www.diariovasco.com/rc/20120911 /mas-actualidad/nacional/pacto-fiscal-marca-diada-
201209110257.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
3. Id.
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the independence process.4 The strong pro-independence nature of this day
took over the political arena in Catalonia, including the Government of the
Generalitat:
Catalonia had never been so close to its aspiration and wish of
independence, as it is right now. Every day that goes by, more
and more Catalonians join the sentiment that it is us, the seven
and a half million people that are part of Catalonia, who are
responsible for deciding our future as people and as a nation.5
II. CATALONIA AS A NATION
Historically, the Catalonian people enjoyed approximately 700 years
of total and secular independence. Before its gradual incorporation to the
new Spanish State following the marriage of Fernando and Isabel in 1469,
Catalonia was a predominant part of the Crown of Aragon, which
controlled an empire across the Mediterranean. After the combination of
the kingdoms of Castilla and Aragon, Catalonia continued as a
constitutional regime and an important independent state. Catalonia
maintained its own administration, jurisprudence, fiscal, monetary, and
economic policies.9 The remains of the Catalonian kingdom remained until
the eighteenth century, when Catalonia lost the War of Secession.10
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Catalonia witnessed a rise in
its nationalism, which took the form of a political movement." This period,
known as the "Renaixenga," coincides in time with the industrial and
4. Cristina Saiz, El Independentismo Cataldn, Mis Alld del Ruido Medidtico [The
Catalonian Independence, Beyond the Mediation Buzz], POLITICACRrICA (Feb. 7, 2013, 12:36 AM),
http://politicacritica.com/2013/02/07/el-independentismo-catalan-mas-alla-del-ruido-mediatico/ (last
visited Oct. 29, 2013).
5. Artur Mas, Missatge Institucional del President de la Generalitat Amb Motiu de la Diada
Nacional de Catalunya [Institutional Message from the President of the Generalitat Amb Motiu of the
Catalonian National Dyad], GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA (2013), available at
http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres fsvp/docs/2012/09/10/18/21/f895cf81-5e64-4258-abfd-2904fa601896.pdf
(last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
6. La Independencia de Cataluiha [Cataluha's Independence], CATALUfIA NUEvo ESTADO
EUROPEO (June 26, 2013, 6:18 PM), http://www.freewebs.com/nacioncatalana/03.htm (last visited Oct.
30, 2013).
7. Christopher K. Connolly, Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the
European Union, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 51, 55 (2013).
8. La Independencia de Cataluia, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. See Connolly, supra note 7, at 7.
11. Id.
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economic development of the region, making it more advanced and
prosperous than Spain.12 However, after the Spanish Civil War (1936-
1939), Catalonia lived one of the darkest periods in its history.13
Catalonians suffered repression of their individual and collective rights,
including the ban of all use of the Catalonian language, denial of the
Catalonian identity, and punishment for cultural expression.14
The Catalonian identity and the request for political autonomy
reemerged during the democratic transition period." During the time of
democracy, the nationalists have worked toward a greater autonomy within
the existing legal and political framework.16 Nonetheless, there is an
increasing tension between Catalonia and Spain.17 In addition to the
existing economic tension derived from the distribution of the wealth, there
is a palpable exasperation due to the passing of the Estatut of Catalunya of
2006. This law approved the existence of an independent Parliament." In
addition, the cutbacks of the Constitutional Tribunal was the triggering
factor of a large manifestation entitled "Som una naci6, nosaltres
decidim."' 9
III. THE ECONOMIC INSTABILITY AND THE COFFEE FOR ALL, THE
TRIGGERS OF THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS
Recently, the independence process has gained momentum as a result
of the economic crisis and basic cutbacks experienced in Catalonia,
including health and education. 20 For some time now in Catalonia, the idea
that "there is a fiscal plundering caused by the central government," and
that the so-called "Coffee for all no longer works," has taken center stage.21
This idea comes from the wealth distribution system that exists in Spain.22
In order to understand this system, one must look at the model of territorial
organization designated by the Spanish Constitution.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Connolly, supra note 7, at 8.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Saiz, supra note 4.
19. Id. ("We are a nation, we decide.").
20. See generally id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Article 137 of the Spanish Constitution establishes that the Spanish
State is divided in municipalities, provinces, and independent
communities.23 Further, it establishes that all these entities enjoy autonomy
to manage their own affairs.24 The State model is set forth in the
Constitution in an imprecise manner.2 5 It is understood that it is a social
and democratic state under the rule of law,26 and that its type of government
is a Parliamentary Monarchy.27 However, it is not certain whether it is a
central state or a federal state, or something in between with characteristics
of both.28 The Constitution is silent on this aspect; it does not define the
Spanish State with any particular structure.29 The Constitutional Tribunal
has defined the constitutionally unnamed type of state as "the State of the
Autonomies.,,o
Several authors have analyzed this model.31 However, the
interventions made by the different parliamentary groups during the
creation of the Constitution of 1978 are of special interest. 32 Among these
opinions, there is a large amount of testimony that states the constitutional
assembly chose a unitary or central state, as opposed to the federal thesis. 3 3
For this reason, Sanchez Agesta states that "the Spanish State, as an
autonomous state, identifies itself as a national state. This state is 'based on
the indissoluble Spanish national unity'-and which recognizes and
guarantees the right of autonomy of the cultural nationalities, and the
historic regions that contributed to its formation over the centuries."34
Other representatives, such as Letamendia, regretfully stated that, "not only
has the path for defense of the right to autonomy been closed by this
Constitution, but it has also closed the path for federalism."35
23. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 137 (Spain).
24. Id.
25. Julio Castelao, Sinopsis del Articulo 137 [Synopsis of Article 137], CONGRESO DE Los
DIPUTADOs, http://www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indiceimprimir/sinopsis pr.js (last visited June
6,2013).
26. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 1.1 (Spain).
27. Id. art. 1.3.
28. Castelao, supra note 25.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Castelao, supra note 25.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution, after stating that the Constitution
is based on the insoluble unity of the Spanish nation, recognizes and
guarantees the autonomy of the nationalities and religions that are part of
them and the solidarity between all of them. 36  In that way, Article 138
guarantees the attainment of what its provided by Article 2. Article 138
does this by attempting to establish an economic balance, suitable and fair
among the diverse parts of the Spanish territory. This is accomplished by
the peculiarity it identifies as insular, stressing that the difference between
the regulations in the distinct autonomous communities "will not be able to
implicate, in any case, economic or social privileges."37
The solution to the territorial instability problem is not feasible without
the use of redistributive techniques that involve a transfer of the public
capital from the richest to the poorest communities with the end of
accomplishing the solidarity principle. Article 157.1(c) of the
Constitution, establishes among the financial resources of the autonomous
communities the transfer of a compensation fund and other assignments in
charge of the State's general budgets.3 9 The goal of the compensation fund
is to correct inter-territorial economic instability and to implement the
solidarity principle.40
For this reason, the Generalitat considers that the return of the
Catalonian contribution to the state should be a lot higher.4 ' In other words:
The difference between the income of the Central Catalonian
Administration and the expenses of the Catalonian territory.4 2 As per the
calculation of the financial scales, this is complex because it is difficult to
separate among the State's taxes such as the sales tax or the society tax, as
it is very uneven between the State and the Generalitat.4 3
In addition, we must add the problems of the lack of liquidity and
resources that must be addressed by the Catalonian Government." These
problems are related, for example, in social policies; the assistance of the
36. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 2 (Spain).
37. Castelao, supra note 25; see also C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Maria Teresa Coca, A que Aspira Cataluhia con el Pacto Fiscal [What does Cataluhia
Aspire with the Fiscal Pact], EL MUNDO (Sept. 20, 2012, 7:41 AM),
http://www.elnundo.es/elmundo/2012/09/19/barcelona/1348077306.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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State to Catalonia has been reduced by 92% in the last three years. 4 5 In
numbers, out of the 72.8 million Euros that were received in 2011, the
Generalitat received approximately 5.8 million Euros in 2013 (according to
the State estimates).46 This drastic reduction in the State's contribution to
the social policies affects all the social programs of the Department for
Social and Familiar Well-being.47
The plan formulated by the Department for Social and Familiar
Well-Being focused on basic social services, a network of social
services of basic needs, and controlled by local corporations,
which has decreased by 68.31%. This is because its funds have
gone from 1,293,386 Euros in 2011 to 3,896,106 Euros in 2013.
The social integral intervention project for the attention, and
prevention of the marginalization and integration of the Gypsy
people has suffered a reduction of 61.48%, as it went from
receiving 99,629 Euros in 2011 to 38,374 Euros in 2013.
The dependence plan-at the agreed upon level-has been
reduced by 100% and has not received any financial contribution
since 2011.
The fund for the reception, integration and support of
immigrants has been reduced by 100% and has not received any
contribution since 2011.
The Program and benefits or services that guarantee the right of
integral social assistance to the victims of gender violence has
been reduced by 19.88%, as it used to receive 632,408 in 2011 to
507,676 in 2013.48
All of this equates to a peak in Catalonian nationalism in an attempt to
search for more political and financial autonomy.49 For this reason, and
after the manifestation of the National Day of Catalonia, the President of
the Generalitat, Artur Mas, asked the Spanish President, Mariano Rajoy, for
a fiscal deal for Catalonia.50 This deal would allow Catalonia to take in
money and manage all taxes through its own fiscal agency.51 The intent
was for agency to take up the role that the State and the Generalitat
45. Espahia Ahoga Econdmicamente a Cataludia [Spain Drowns Cataluia Economically],
HELP CATALONIA (Mar. 26, 2013), http://es.helpcatalonia.cat/2013/03/espana-ahoga-economicamente-
catalunya.html (last visited July 7, 2013).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Connolly, supra note 7, at 10.
50. Id.
51. Coca, supra note 41.
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currently have, and to avoid that the former only act as a tax collector.52
After the denial of the Rajoy administration, the Generalitat responded by
voting in favor of having a referendum for the independence and
summoned elections. These elections have the goal of forming a nationalist
government and to gather the maximum amount of nationalist seats in the
Parliament.5 3 The current Generalitat President has recently made a deal
with the leader of the Republican Esquerra, Oriol Jonqueres, to have
Catalonia hold a referendum for the auto-determination during 2014.54
IV. FOUR WAYS TO INDEPENDENCE
A. Consultative Referendum in Catalonia
The consultative referendum is a way of democratic exercise that is
direct. The referendum is an institution in which the citizens are the
protagonists in making the political decision.'6 In other words, the final
decision is attributed to the citizens. This method of direct democratic
exercise, is an indication of the Constitutional compromise that "allows for
the participation of all the citizens in the political, economical, cultural and
social life."
The Spanish Constitution allows for a consultative referendum
regarding "political decisions of particular importance."5 9  The
Constitutional Tribunal has defined the referendum as an instrument of
participation that is direct and political.o More specifically, it has
determined that a referendum is a type of "popular inquiry" through which
the popular opinion is not gathered for any matter of public interest, but
rather it is an inquiry regarding public matters as defined in Article 23 of
the Constitution61 and that is carried out through its respective electoral
52. Id.
53. Connolly, supra note 7, at I1.
54. Cataluhia Votard la Independencia [Catalunya will Vote for Independence], E-NOTICIES
(June 26, 2013, 2:14 PM), http://www.e-noticies.com/popup/imprimir/)iddoc=71199&idi=es (last
visited Oct. 30, 2013).
55. MIGUEL ANGEL APARICIO, MANUAL DE DERECHO CONSilTUCIONAL [MANUAL OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 107-14 (2009).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 9.2 (Spain).
59. Id. art. 23.1.
60. See S.T.C., Sept. 11, 2008 (B.O.E., No. 245 Supp., p.10) (Spain).
61. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 23.1 (Spain) ("Los ciudadanos tiene el derecho a
participar en los asuntos pdblicos, directamente o por medio de representantes, libremente elegidos en
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62process. In these types of cases, the subject to be consulted is the
electoral body, and as such, their summonses are within Article 149.1.3263
of the Constitution. 4
The consultative referendum must be summoned by the King through
a proposal by the government's President, and previously approved by
Congress. Such approval must be a passed by an absolute majority of the
House of the Presidential proposal, and said proposal must contain the exact
terms by which the inquiry will be formulated. 6 The House will debate
this proposal, and the debate will be done under the same norms previously
used.6 ' The President of the House will then communicate Congress's
68decision to the government.
Once authorization is given, there will be a summons by the King
through a Royal Decree, as agreed between the Board of Ministries and its
President. In any case, the Royal Decree must contain the complete text
of the decision, state the question or questions that will be answered by the
electoral body, and establish a date on which election will be held, which
must be within 365 days of the publication of said Decree. 70 This date must
be given the utmost publicity, including: Publication in the State's Official
Bulletin, publication in the Official Bulletins of all the autonomous
communities affected, publication in all newspapers edited in said
elecciones peri6dicas por sufragio universal") ["The citizens have the right to participate in public
matters, directly or through representatives, freely elected in periodical elections through universal
suffrage."].
62. See S.T.C., Sept. 11, 2008 (B.O.E., No. 245 Supp., p.10) (Spain) (La sentencia, resuelve el
recurso de inconstitucionalidad interpuesto contra la Ley del Parlamento Vasco 9/2008, de 27 de Junio,
de convocatoria y regulaci6n de una consulta popular al objeto de recabar la opini6n ciudadana en la
Comunidad Aut6noma del Pais Vasco sobre la apertura de un proceso de negociaci6n para alcanzar la
paz y la normalizaci6n politica.) [The sentence, resolves the unconstitutional recourse brought against
the Basque Parliament's law of 9/2008 June 27, for a consultation and regulation of a public vote in
order to collect the citizen's opinion in the Basque country in regards to the start of a negotiation process
to reach peace and political normalization.].
63. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 149.1.32 (Spain) ("El Estado tiene competencia
exclusiva sobre ... la autorizaci6n para la convocatoria de consultas populares por via de referendum")
["The State has exclusive power in regards to ... the authorization to propose a popular vote by means
of a referendum."].
64. See S.T.C., Sept. 11, 2008 (B.O.E., No. 245 Supp., p.11) (Spain).
65. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, art. 92.2 (Spain).
66. L.O.P.J., B.O.E. n. 20, Jan. 23, 1980, art. 6 (Spain).
67. Reglamento del Congreso de los Diputados [Regulations of Members of Congress],
B.O.E. n. 55, Mar. 5, 1982, art. 161.2 (Spain).
68. Id. art. 161.3.
69. L.O. 50/1997, B.O.E. n. 285, Nov. 28, 1997, art. 2.2(e) (Spain).
70. L.O. 2/1980, B.O.E. n. 20, Jan. 23, 1980, art. 3 (Spain).
communities and with circulation in all of Spain, publication of the
attachment to the edicts in all the affected local governments, diplomatic
and consular representations, and broadcast over radio and television.71
In Catalonia's case, the consultative referendum's process would
consist of the central government's summons and would authorize the
Generalitat to know the will of its citizens.72 In other words, Catalonia
would continue its development of local and state laws as it is established in
Article 149.1.32 of the Spanish Constitution. The Academic of Political
Science of the Universidad de Barcelona, Rodriguez-Aguilera, stated, "[i]f
the yes were to win, it would open a constitutional reform process to
recognize the right of auto determination."74 According to Professor Garcia
Roca, professor of Constitutional Law at the Universidad Complutense de
Madrid, this system would be based upon and would support the decision
by the Supreme Court of Canada, which recognizes the right to call for a
referendum with a clear question, full guarantees, and a qualified
majority.75
The decision referenced by Doctor Garcia Roca is the "Reference re
Secession of Quebec," in 1996. This decision establishes that a clear and
majoritarian vote in Quebec regarding the question favoring the secession
initiative would confer democratic legitimacy to it, and that all the other
participants in the confederation should recognize the vote.77 The decision
states, that even though a unilateral secession would be illegal, doing so
through a referendum under Canadian Law would be valid, leaving the rest
of Canada without grounds to negate the right of Quebec's Government to
pursue secession. However, Allen Buchanan, professor at Duke
University, does not believe that Spain should follow the Canadian path.
71. Id. art. 3.2.
72. Maria Salgado, Los Expertos Aseguran que la Secesidn de Cataluiha es Posible si hay una
Mayoria y Negociacidn [The Experts Guarantee that secession is Possible in Catalufia if there is a
Majority and Negotiations], 20MINUTOS.Es (Jun. 29, 2013), http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/15857
67/0/cataluna-secesion/independencia/mayoria-negociacion/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Reference re Secession of Quebec, (1996] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
77. Id. at 220.
78. Id. at 221.
79. Allen Buchanan, Cataluhia Tendria que Pedir la Mediacidn de la ONU si Espalta
Menospreciase el Referdndum, Entrevista [ Cataluna Would Have to Request Mediation from the UN if
Spain Dismisses the Referendum, Interview], SINPERMISO.INFO (July 7, 2013),
http://www.sinpermiso.info/textos/index.phpid=6132 (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
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It is his opinion that Spain could offer Catalonia, as a response to a
referendum in favor of secession, substantial autonomy, similar to one in
the Basque Country,o with some sort of guarantee that an autonomy
agreement would not be breached.8'
In Catalonia's case, it is important to remember that a referendum
regarding a decision about secession would be consultative. However,
because the referendum is merely consultative, the President of the Superior
Tribunal of Justice, Miguel Angel Gimeno, states
[T]hat the result of the election would not have a legal effect.
We would go ahead with the inquiry, we would find out an
answer, but what would that imply? The effect would not be
legal, but rather political, and as such, we would continue to have
a political discussion." 82
Nevertheless, professors in this school of thought, such as Satamaria
Pastor, are of the opinion that it is "essential that the institution that would
adopt the decision would do so contrary to the pronouncement of the will of
the people." 3 The problem in Catalonia's case is that once there is a result
for the inquiry there would be a reference to the government so that it
adopts the measurements for the formalization of the popular decision.84
In June 2013, the Center for Opinion Studies of the Generalitat
published a poll that stated 55.6% of Catalonians would vote in favor of
independence in an electoral inquiry regarding auto-determination.s
Among the survey respondents, 51.2% thought that the quality of life would
be better in an independent Catalonia. 6  Similarly, the Center for
Sociological Investigations, which is dependent of the Spanish Presidential
80. Id.
81. Buchanan, supra note 79.
82. Luis B. Garcia, El Presidente del 7'SJC ve "Francamente Complicado" Celebrar una
Consulta [The President of TSJC Sees as "Honestly Complicated" to Celebrate a Conference],
LAVANGUARDIA.COM (June 7, 2013, 8:27 PM), http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20130606
/presidente-tsjc-francamente-complicado-celebrar-consulta.html# (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
83. Jose Luis Lpez Gonzdlez, El Referendum Nacional Consultivo Sobre Decisiones
Politicas de Especial Trascendencia [The National Consultative Referendum in Regards to Political
Decisions of Special Transcendence], in CUADERNOS CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CATEDRA DE FADRIQUE
FURIO CERIOL 215 (Universitat de Valencia ed., 2002).
84. Id.
85. El 55% de los Catalanes Votaria a Favor de la Independencia [55 % of Catalonians
Would Vote in Favor of Independence], LAVANGUARDIA.COM (June 6, 2013, 9:15 AM),
http://www.lavanguardiac.com/politica/20130620/54376823885/55-catalanes-votaria-favor-
independencia.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
86. Id.
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Ministry, states that 41% of those asked would be in favor of Catalonia
87becoming independent. In sum, the data reveals that in a hypothetical
election, Catalonians would vote in favor of the creation of a new
independent state.88  This inquiry would also require that the Spanish
Government consider a constitutional reform.89 Today, that would be the
only way to change the "unity" that is established by Article 2 of the
Spanish Constitution. Furthermore, on a Parliamentary-level, the viability
of this inquiry is even more complicated.90 The Catalonian nationalist
movement should look for support in the State's political parties in order to
have a constitutional reform that would allow binding referendum, which
requires an approval of two-thirds of both Parliamentary Houses. 91
Under the idea that Catalonia could summon for a referendum on the
question of secession under the Spanish legal frame, it is important to ask if
Catalonia could summon for this inquiry through the Generalitat. First, it is
important to note that Catalonia lacks competence regarding referendums.
This is because the Catalonia Autonomy Statute only attributed the
Generalitat with power to establish the following: A judicial regime, the
modality, procedure and way in which is done, the summons, the polls,
public hearings, participation forums, and any other forums of popular
inquiry.92 Without previous reform in the Organic Law Regulating the
Diverse Forms of Referendum, a summons by the Generalitat to a
referendum could fall outside the Spanish legal frame, and thus potentially
be a unilateral secession.9 3
B. Consultative Referendum in All of Spain
A consultative referendum in all of Spain would consist of the Spanish
Government calling for a consultative referendum at the state level.9 4 "It is
not evident that Spaniards would vote against the Catalonian Session." 95 In
87. Saiz, supra note 4.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Estatuto de Autonomia de Catalufia [Cataluna's Autonomy Status], B.O.E. n. 172, July 20,
2006, art. 122 (Spain).
93. Emilio Pajares, Constituci6n y Referindum de Independencia en Cataluhia [Constitution
and Independence Referendum in Cataluila], DIARIOJURIDICO.COM (Nov. 26, 2011, 12:00 AM),
http://www.diariojuridico.com/opinion/constitucion-y-referendum-de-independencia-en-cataluna.html
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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fact, there are more English people in favor of the independence of
Scotland than Scottish people according to University of Barcelona
96professor Rodriguez Aguilera. The polls in Scotland show that 43% of
the English people would approve Scottish independence. Nonetheless,
the Scottish secession process is radically different than the Catalonian
one. 9 8  First, the constant dialogue between the English and Scottish
Governments have made it possible to set a date for the election, September
18, 2014.99 On the other hand, the Spanish Government has not heard the
claims of secession made by the Catalonians.'00 In addition, the Scottish
people do not show a strong support to the secessions demands; only 30%
of those asked show support for independence.' 01 In Catalonia, secession is
supported by more than 50% of its people. 02
Among the arguments in support of a consultative referendum at the
state level, as it is established in Article 92 of the Constitution, is that
political decisions of special importance should be submitted to all citizens,
and not only to a portion of the population.0 3  For that reason, Maria
Dolores Cospedal, member of the Popular Party (PP), affirmed that the
future of Spain should be decided among all Spaniards." Further, she also
stated that the future of the region is to be decided not only by those who
live in Calatonia, but also by those that do not.10
96. Id.
97. Ainhoa Paredes, Inglaterra Dice si a Escocia [England Says Yes to Scotland],
NABARRALDE.COM (July 30, 2013, 10:27 PM), http://www.nabarralde.com/es/munduan/7798-
inglaterra-dice-si-a-escocia?tmplOcomponent&print=1 &layout-default&page= (last visited Oct. 29,
2013).
98. See generally El Secession Independentista de Escocia se Celebrard el 18 de Septiembre
de 2014 [The Scottish Independence Secession will be Celebrated on September 18, 2014], PUBLICO.ES
(July 20, 2013, 10:40 PM), http://www.publico.es/intemacional/452492/el-referendum-independentista-
de-escocia-se-celebrara-el-1 8-de-septiembre-de-2014/version-imprimible (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See generally El 55% de los Catalanes Votaria a Favor de la Independencia, supra note
85.
103. Francisco Rubio Llorente, Un Referindum que Nadie Quiere [A Referendum that Nobody
Wants], ELPAIS.COM (July 30, 2013, 10:15 PM), http://www.elpais.com/
elpais/2013/02/01/opinion/1359716070_365196.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
104. Id.
105. Alberto R. Roldin, Cospedal: El Futuro de Cataluiia lo Decidimos Entre Todos los
Espaiioles [Cataluiia's Future Will be Decided Amongst all Spaniards], LARAZON.ES (July 17, 2013,
1:23 PM), http://www.larazon.es/detallehemeroteca/noticias/LARAZON_488764/8286-maria-
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This argument, however, seems to be construed under the premise that
a representative can only do what the Constitution allows him or her to
do.106 This seems an erroneous premise if compared with the Constitutional
principle that establishes that a representative has the freedom to do, and is
only limited by what the Constitution prohibits.'0 7 Under these parameters,
the General Courts, as owners of sovereignty and representatives of the
Spanish people, could authorize a referendum in the territorial scope of
what is restricted. 08  This would allow the first method discussed: The
consultative referendum in Catalonia.109
C. Declaration of Independence and Referendum for Auto Determination
"This method is always the result of a break up and it tends to be
violent, complex, and hard," according to Perez Francesch, Professor at the
Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona."o The Catalonian Parliament would
make a unilateral declaration of independence and would call for a
referendum of auto-determination for shelter of international law, reason for
which there should be ample support for the secession."' After this, the
construction of the new State, new Constitution, and new laws would
begin.1 12
This method actually has the support of the international legal
community, which normally takes a neutral position regarding secession."13
The actions of secession are analyzed under the domestic laws of each
country, while the international law is only concerned about its
consequences.1 4  Even though international law recognized auto-
determination, application of said law would result in a dramatic weakening
of the state sovereignty and a restructuration of the framework of the
dolores-de-cospedal-el-futuro-de-cataluna-lo-decidimos-entre-todos-los-espanoles (last visited Oct. 29,
2013).
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international community.' 15 For this reason, application of this law to auto-
determination has been very selective and limited in several aspects.' 16
To date, public international law has recognized the right of free
determination in two different notions of people."' For "colonial people"
and by extension, any persons submitted to foreign control, are qualified as
contrary to international law. The other group is referred to as nationals or
citizens of a state.'18  Among the latter, international law has made a
distinction between "minorities" and "indigenous people."" 9
Catalonia is among the group of people known as a group of nationals
or citizens of a State. More specifically, it is among the "minorities"
subcategory.12 The Declaration of the United Nations regarding
Minorities, approved in 1992, in its first article, defines minorities based on
their national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic identities, and it
establishes that the states must protect their existence. 12 1 The most
accepted definition of minority is that one given in 1977 by Francesco
Capotorti, Special Narrator of the Sub-commission for the Prevention of
Discrimination and the Protection of the Minorities:
A group that in numbers is inferior to the rest of the population of
a State. A group that is located in a non-dominant position and
whose members, who are citizens of the State, have ethnic,
religious, or linguistic characteristics that are different to the rest
of the population. A group of people that manifest, even if its
just in an implicit manner, a sentiment of solidarity to preserve
their culture, traditions, religions or language.122
This definition encompasses people such as the Catalonian, Scottish,
or people from Quebec in Canada.123 Matters regarding minorities are in a
legal sphere ruled by Article 27 of the International Pact of Civil and
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Victor M. Sinchez, Autodeterminacidn, Secesi6n y Derecho Internacional
[Autodetermination, Secession and International Law], ELDEBAT.CAT (July 6, 2013, 6:33 PM),
http://www.eldebat.cat/client/print/printnotice.php?IDN=64352 (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
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Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49 (Vol. 1), U.N.
Doc. A/47/49 (Vol. 1), en 210 (18 de Diciembre de 1992).
122. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, para. 568.
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Political Rights of 1966 (PCPR). This Article makes this definition
mandatory for states, such as in the case of Spain and Catalonia.'2 4 Article
27 specifies that "in States in which there are ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities, people that belong to such minorities will not be denied their
due right to have their own cultural life, to live and to preach their religion,
and to use their own language." 25 Although, international law does not
promote the discrimination of minorities, it does, however, lack assurance
for political autonomy.126  Thus, the Declaration of the United Nations
regarding Minorities promotes certain minority political rights, as long as
such rights are not incompatible with the national legislation.127
Even though international law has not created a "right to secession"
for "minorities," it has not prohibited minorities from aspiring to create a
new State through secession from another State.128 If a portion of the
territory separates international law-only states that, if at the end of this
process the State holds the elements of nationalization, it must be treated
like any other state in the world.12 9 After nationalization, it is understood
that the new state will have a defined territory, a stable population, and a
government that can exercise its public functions for a sustained amount of
time in a sovereign and independent manner.130
In addition, it is important to remember that the international
community generally looks at these phenomena with suspicion.' 3 ' For
example, the above-mentioned Declaration points out that every attempt
geared towards the partial or total break up of the national unity and
territorial integrity of a country, is incompatible with the purpose and
principles under the United Nations Charter.13 2 In the same fashion the
Declaration on international law regarding the relations and cooperation
among the States, in accordance with the Charter, confirms these
sentiments'33 even though its primary declaration establishes that all the
people have the right to freely determine its political condition without
external influence, and to look after their economic, social, and cultural
124. Id.
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development, further establishing that all states must respect these rights.134
Next, it marks the limits and conditions of these rights:
None of the preceding will be understood as authorizing or
encouraging any action geared towards shattering or scoming,
partially or completely, the territorial integrity of the sovereign
and independent States that conduct themselves in conformity
with principles of equality of rights and free determination of the
aforementioned people. Thus, they have a government that
represents the totality of the eople in their territory, without
racial, or religious distinctions.
In conclusion, the principle of free determination of the people, outside
the colonizing framework, refers to the internal channels of every state to
listen to the demands of secession of its minorities. 136 Even taking this into
account, some authors have stated that every minority or group has the right
to secession as a right to "correct."137 Allen Buchanan, a professor from
Duke University, stands out among said authors.' 38  According to
Buchanan, the right to "correct" recognizes four types of injustice:
1) The unfair attachment of the territory of a sovereign State;
2) Large scale violations of fundamental human rights;
3) Continued discriminatory redistribution; and
4) The State's infringement on the duties of the autonomous
interstate regime or continued denial to negotiate a way of
continued intrastate autonomy.' 39
In Catalonia's case, the unfair attachment of the territory of a
sovereign State would not be met. Catalonia was added to the Spanish
territory in 1714, after the city of Barcelona's surrender and the Nueva
Planta Decree, more than three hundred years ago.14 0  Trying to find
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135. Id.
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138. See generally Allen Buchanan, ZTiene Cataluia Derecho a la Secesidn? [Does Cataluiia
Have the Right to Secession?], ELPAIS.COM (July 2, 2013, 11:24 AM),
http://www.politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/05/24/actualidad/1369396168_202422.html (last visited
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justification in a territorial attachment that took place so long ago could
cause massive political instability and widespread violence.141
The second case of injustice that is proposed by the corrective right
does not apply to Catalonia either. Today, Catalonia does not suffer of
violations of fundamental human rights by the Spanish State.142 The main
arguments that justify the right to secession of Catalonia are: First, an
argument that demonstrates that Catalonia is subdued due to a
discriminatory, grave, and permanent redistribution, and second, there has
to be an argument that demonstrates that Spain consistently denies granting
the suitable autonomy for Catalonia within the Spanish State.14 3
Regarding the discriminatory redistribution, we must take into account
that in practically all states that are engaged with the well-being of all of
their citizens will have a considerable redistribution of their regions.'"
Unless we reject the idea of a state engaged in the well-being, we must
accept the redistribution.145 In order to determine whether the unjust
redistribution is legal under the corrective right, we must also determine
whether it is unfair or discriminatory.14 6
In 2012, the Catalonian parties agreed and demanded the payment of
the 11,000 million Euros owed to Catalonia by the Spanish government.14 7
This debt comes from the decisions made in Madrid that will cost Catalonia
2,428.9 million Euros.14 8 In addition, we must add the former the debt
which amounts to more than 8,605.4 million Euros, as well as other
outstanding debts, such as the competitive fund, 1,450 million Euros, the
investment liquidations, 759 million Euros in 2008, 219 million Euros in
2009, or the efforts of the Generalitat, 235 million Euros in the dependency
law or 70 million Euros in abortion law.14 9
To these numbers, we must add a report published in the Spanish
Studies Institute's periodicals under the sponsorship of the Spanish
Confederation of Corporate Organization. This report concludes that the
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current funding system is insufficient, unfair, and unclear in its
functioning.150
Even when taking this information into account, which is favorable for
Catalonia's position, we must also look at other information such as
presented by Free Market. According to this publication, the Generalitat
received an autonomous share four times higher than the one received by
Madrid's Government, or 60% compared to 17%, respectively.'' The
conclusion that this information presents is that discriminatory
redistribution is currently happening. Further, it concludes that it is severe
enough to justify the radical response of secession, even though it may be
harder than it appears.' 5 2
Another strong argument for Catalonia's unilateral secession is that
Spain has not acted in good faith when responding to the demands of an
increased level of intrastate autonomy.153  The Spanish Government has
refused to negotiate with Catalonian nationalists.154  When faced with
current demands by the Catalonian Government, the Spanish Government
has limited itself to repeating that a referendum would be constitutionally
illegal, and that it would do anything necessary to prevent it.' 5 If the
Spanish Government continues to refuse the referendum while not
presenting another viable alternative, Catalonia's Government will have to
look for international support, e.g., the United Nations, or regional, e.g., the
European Union (EU), in order to pressure Spain to cooperate. 56
Nevertheless, the EU could refuse to help because it would fear the creation
of precedent and be called to intervene in more auto-determination
conflicts.15 7
Even though doubt exists as to the support or mediator role the EU
could have, there are also doubts as to whether a Catalonian State would be
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accepted as an EU Member.'18 During an interview in 2012, the President
of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, said that a State that
separated from an already-existing Member State would have to apply for
admission to the EU by itself, following all the proper procedures. 59 Even
though there is no precedent or communitarian agreements on the subject,
international law and the practice of international organization seem to
support Barroso's opinion."o
The legal uncertainty of the still-fictitious secession ranges from the
continuity of European rights to Catalonian citizens, until the state is re-
admitted.16' Furthermore, Catalonia's currency is the Eurol 62 and its border
control is ruled by the Schengen Agreement.16 3
In conclusion, Catalonia must present strong arguments based on an
uneven or unfair redistribution, or the denial of the Spanish Government to
hear its demands. Even taking that into account, the future of a unilateral
secession is uncertain, both under the international and EU legal frames.
D. Independence-Association
"Independence not always means that Catalonia has to completely
leave Spain," according to Perez Francesh, professor from the Universidad
Auntonoma de Barcelona.'1' This method would entail in Catalonia having
its own government, and then have the liberty to freely associate itself with
the Spanish Government, similar to the relationship between Puerto Rico
and the United States. 6 5
Spain relinquished Puerto Rico to the United States in 1898.166 As a
result, Puerto Rico became a territory of the United States, and as such, it
became one its assets.167 In the 1901 case of Downes v. Bidwell, the United
States Supreme Court established that Puerto Rico was an unincorporated
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state.'68  In this case, Samuel Downes, owner of Downes & Company,
imported oranges to New York, and was obligated to pay taxes under the
Foraker Law.169 His claim was that Puerto Rico was a U.S. territory, and
thus, subject to the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution, which establishes
that all taxes would be uniform throughout the entire nation.170
Since the tax for oranges did not exist anywhere else in the United
States, it could not exist for Puerto Rico.' 7' In its decision, the Court held
that new territories that are attached were not under the scope of Article I,
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.172 Today, the political status of Puerto
Rico is uncertain.173 Although their defense and military issues are under
United States control, Puerto Rico maintains their own governmental
branches, economy, and post offices, all while still being considered
Americans. 74
Taking into account that the increase in Catalonian nationalism has
coincided in time with the current economic downturn, and the constant
economic and fiscal policy disagreements under the Spanish rule, a type of
association where Catalonia is still under Spain's control is highly
improbable. 7 1
V. THE VIABILITY OF THE CATALONIAN STATE
The purpose of this section is not to analyze every economic, social,
and cultural aspect that could affect the viability of a Catalonian State. It is
imperative, however, to analyze some of the key facts and commentaries in
the event that Catalonia does become an independent state.
A. Pension Rights
Catalonia would be able to afford its pension and unemployment
compensation as an independent State, according the calculations of the
168. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341 (1901).
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Economic Ministry.176  If Catalonia had had its own Social Security
between 1995 to 2010, it would have accumulated more than 24,774
million Euros. Catalonia, however, contributes 19.2% of the social
contributions to the Spanish State, and it only receives 17.3% of the
benefits. 177
B. Exports and Their Importance for Catalonia's Economy
Exports constitute an important part of the growth of any economy.
They are especially important for regional economies, which because of
their small size, depend in great part on the rest of the world in order to
conduct trade.17 8  The nationalists present information that demonstrates
that in 2012, Catalonia exported merchandise in value of 58,282.9 million
Euros, 5% more than the previous year.179 In addition, they allege that in
2011, for the first time in history, sales to other countries were more than
the rest of Spain combined. 80 According to evaluations made in this field,
the openness of the Catalonian economy is comparable to that of countries
like Denmark.' 8' The nationalists use this information to help explain that
if there were a Spanish boycott on their economy, less than half of the
Catalonian economy would be affected.182
The Catalonian economy has an important weight in the Spanish
economy.8 8 The total Catalonian population (approximately 7,539,618)
accounts for about 16% of the total Spanish population (approximately
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disposara-duna-Seguretat-Social-propia-i-viable-que-pagui-pensions-i-prestacions-datur/animated/preguntes/
41.html#.UfwEQhbKJER (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
177. Id.
178. Clemente Polo, El Peso de las Exportaciones en la Economia Catalane [The weight of
Exportations in the Catalonian Economy], in LA CUESTION CATALANA HOY 57, 60 (Instituto de
Estudios Econ6micos ed., 2012).
179. Les Exportacions Catalanes Serdn Suficients per Esquivar un Hipoteic Boicot del Mercat
Espahol a Una Cataluia Independent? [Will the Catalonian Exportations be Enough to Avoid a
Hypothetic Boycott from the Spanish Market Towards the Independence of Cataluhia?], ELCLAUER.CAT
(June 29, 2013, 8:41 PM), http://www.elclauer.cat/LEstat-catala-disposara-duna-Seguretat-Social-
propia-i-viable-que-pagui-pensions-i-prestacions-datur/animated/preguntes/41.html#.UfwF5xbKJET
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Les Exportacions Catalanes Serdn Suficients].
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Polo, supra note 178, at 57.
2014] Garcia 419
420 ILSA Journal ofInternational & Comparative Law
47,190,493).184 The National Statistics Institute establishes the GDP in
200,323.5 million or a GDP of 18.7% in 2011.185 For this reason, Clemente
Polo, Professor from the Universidad de Barcelona, considers that Spain
continues to be an important part of the Catalonian economy, and thus an
eventual independence could put the well-being of an important portion of
the population at risk. 186
For this reason, nationalists tend to go back to the campaign against
cava sales in 2004, a period in which sales dropped 10%.187 Some experts
calculated that Catalonia's GDP would be reduced by 4%, and
approximately 13,000 jobs would be lost as a consequence of a 40%
boycott by consumers and 20% of the business in the case of
independence. 8 8 In the nationalist's words, the experts admit that these are
worst-case scenarios. It is further presumed that in an agreed
independence, the hostility level would be lower than that experienced in
2004, when the tension between the Generalitat and the central government
started to take shape.189
IV. CONCLUSION
It is very hard for the international community to disregard the push
toward the Catalonian independence.1 90 Secession goes against the two
pillars of the State system: Sovereignty and territorial integrity.'91 For this
reason, the first conclusion is that the secession process is uncertain and
tortuous. It is uncertain because international and state legislation do not
support a unilateral secession in Catalonia. It is tortuous because the
citizens of this new and old state could be affected economically, and they
could potentially lose their rights, as would be the case if Catalonians are
forced to leave the EU.
The second conclusion that can be reached is that the secession
process in Catalonia is more uncertain and tortuous than it would be in
Scotland, given the Spanish Government's refusal to negotiate. The
Generalitat's Government attempted to negotiate a fiscal pact after
Catalonia's National Day manifestation. The pact was supposed to give
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Les Exportacions Catalanes Serdn Suficients, supra note 179.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Connolly, supra note 7, at 67.
191. Id.
[Vol. 20:3
2014] Garcia 421
greater financial autonomy and self-government without secession.
However, the lack of dialog by the Spanish Government has made forced
Catalonia's demands to reach the point of asking for nationalization and
secession from Spain.
Europe has not made any pronouncements as to how it will act in the
event that Catalonia were to declare its independence in a unilateral
manner. Will Catalonians be forced to leave the EU? Will they lose the
Euro as their currency? Will they lose their communitarian rights? The EU
should make a pronouncement in the matter and open the communication
between Spain and Catalonia. If secession is inevitable, it is better that it is
done under EU terms as opposed to unilaterally between Spain and
Catalonia directly.
